Marquette Law Review
Volume 61
Issue 2 Winter 1977

Article 9

Property
Natalie B. Koehn

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Natalie B. Koehn, Property, 61 Marq. L. Rev. 345 (1977).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol61/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

1977]

TERM OF THE COURT

a judicial determination of unconstitutionality,47 and concluded that,
where there has been no specific prior adjudication of unconstitutionality, the electorate under the direct legislation statutes, may compel placement on the ballot regardless of grave
doubts in respect to constitutionality and statutory validity.
Only after the measure has passed and a controversy arises
may a court of this state pass upon the question of constitutionality."
Section 9.20 is based upon the reserved legislative powers
of the electorate49 and has priority over the legislative discretion of the city council. The city council may take into account
the possibility of conflict with state statutes or of unconstitutionality of the proposal when it initiates legislation. However,
the council is statutorily obligated to either enact the measure
itself or to submit it to a public vote when, as in this case, the
reserved powers of the electorate are involved."0 Thus, under
the direct legislation statute, no determination of constitutionality is appropriate before the electorate has voted.5 Issues of
statutory conflict and constitutionality are to be dealt with by
the judiciary if the measure is enacted and later challenged. 2
CORNELIA GRIFFIN FARMER

PROPERTY
I.

EMINENT DOMAIN

In Falkner v. Northern States Power Co.,' the court affirmed the controversial taking of farm land by a Wisconsin
public corporation 2 for the future construction' of a large nu47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

110, 255 N.W.2d at
117-18, 255 N.W.2d
118-19, 255 N.W.2d
110, 255 N.W.2d at
119, 255 N.W.2d at

455.
at 458.
at 459.
455.
459.

1. 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885 (1977).
2. Power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty which may be delegated
to a corporation by the legislature. Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 39, 54
N.W. 1003 (1893); Wis. STAT. § 32.02(6) (1975).
3. At trial the estimated completion dates of the units were April 1982, and October
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clear generating station.' Pursuant to statute,' jurisdictional
offers were served on the appellants, owners of the Dunn
County land, on January 25, 1974. The offers were refused.
Appellants commenced actions to contest the condemnation,'
citing various uncertainties and contingencies which could prevent the construction of the power plant,7 and contending that
8
these uncertainties evidenced a lack of public use or necessity.
Simultaneously, Northern States instituted condemnation proceedings pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 32.06(7). All
actions were tried together on July 29 and 30, 1974.1
Three months after the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of the condemnation, chapter 68, Laws of 1975 was enacted. 6 Under chapter 68, construction of all bulk generating
facilities is prohibited without a certificate of public convenience from the Public Service Commission. The appellants' subsequent motions to restrain further condemnation proceedings
1983, respectively. Due to revised demand projections and concern over energy conservation, the completion date for the first unit has been extended to April 1985; the
deadline for the second unit has been postponed indefinitely. 75 Wis. 2d at 137 n. 12,
248 N.W. 2d at 897 n.12.
4. The station, Tyrone Energy Park, will consist of two independent units, each
with a generative capacity of 1150 megawatts. 75 Wis. 2d at 118 & 136 n.11, 248
N.W.2d at 890 & 896 n..
5. Wis. STAT. § 32.06(3) (1975).
6. The appeal was taken pursuant to Wis. STAT. § 32.06(5) (1975). See Weeden v.
Beloit, 22 Wis. 2d 414, 126 N.W.2d 54 (1964). Under prior law, the owner had two
alternatives: (1) to appeal from the award of the commissioner, or (2) to seek an
independent award in equity. Ferguson v. Kenosha, 5 Wis. 2d 556, 93 N.W.2d 460
(1958).
7. Appellants alleged the following problems:
(a) Funds had not been obtained, nor had the specific source been identified.
(b) Sufficient testing to apply for necessary permits had not been performed.
(c) Building plans and environmental reports had not been completed.
(d) A final decision to go through with the plan construction had not been
made by the defendant's Board of Directors.
75 Wis. 2d at 125, 248 N.W.2d at 125.
8. A taking for a nonpublic use is unconstitutional. Schumm v. Milwaukee County,
258 Wis. 256, 45 N.W.2d 673 (1951).
9. Clearly, WIs. STAT. ch. 32 (1975) provides for two independent, yet procedurally
simultaneous actions by the condemnor and condemnee. The curious effect at trial is
to combine the property owner's action contesting the right to condemn with the
judicial determination of the necessity of the taking-a determination that logically
would have occurred before the institution of condemnation proceedings. Neither party
objected to the proceeding. 75 Wis. 2d at 119, 248 N.W.2d at 888. See REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, WISCONSIN GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEMS OF LAND

(1958).
10. The memorandum decision was dated June 2, 1975. On Sept. 30, 1975, ch. 68
(Wis. STAT. § 196.491) became law.
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on the grounds that Northern States had failed to obtain the
requisite certificates were denied." Appeals were taken from
these orders.'

2

Consistent with the presumption of validity usually accorded legislative actions, the Wisconsin legislature or its delegate has inherent power to determine the necessity of taking for
a public purpose. Thus, the majority of Wisconsin's eminent
domain litigation centers around procedural and evaluation
5
issues" rather than questions of necessity and public usage,'
and the courts are limited to a narrow scope of judicial review.' 8
Under Falkner, a right to condemnation is established when
the following two criteria are met: 1) There is a reasonable
probability that the public improvement "will meet all requirements for the issuance of necessary permits, and will not otherwise fail or be unable to prosecute its undertaking to completion"; 7 and 2) The taking of the land is reasonably necessary
to fulfill the public purpose.'8
11. 75 Wis. 2d at 119-20, 248 N.W.2d at 888.
12. The court noted that "at first blush" the review standard mandated by ch. 32
would seem to be necessity. However, since the chapter has no clear criteria for measuring necessity, the standard is a difficult one to apply. Invoking the power of eminent
domain constitutes an implicit decision that the taking is necessary for public purposes. This decision is.reviewable. Wis. STAT. § 32.06(5) (1975). The standard applied
is whether the decision constitutes fraud, bad faith or a gross abuse of discretion on
the part of the condemnor. 75 Wis. 2d at 132, 248 N.W.2d at 894.
13. See note 8, supra.The question of whether a delegation of power by the legislature is constitutional is well-settled. Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 39,
54 N.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1893); David Jeffrey Co. v. Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W.2d
362 (1954); 1 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11 (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman,
1973 recomp. P. Rohan) (1973) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
14. For example, in Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 78 Wis. 2d 235, 253
N.W.2d 896 (1977), the court addressed the question of whether compensation for
realigning the personal property of a tenant is allowed in a partial taking. Wisconsin
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 Wis. 2d 442, 249 N.W.2d 543 (1977) held that
compensation was constitutionally required only for a taking and not for damages to
property resulting from an exercise of the state's police power. See ORGEL, VALUATION
UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN

(1953);

NICHOLS,

supra note 13.

15. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 297 (1966) for public usage and necessity requirements
in other jurisdictions.
16. Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957). The court said that:
[A] court will not interfere with the choice of particular lands by a power
company unless necessary to prevent an abuse of discretion by an attempted
taking in utter disregard of necessity for it. . . . Judicial interference. . .would
at most be warranted only by a convincing showing that the determination is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not made in good faith.
274 Wis. at 612, 81 N.W. at 47.
17. 75 Wis. 2d at 129, 248 N.W.2d at 893.
18. To support condemnation, only reasonable, not absolute or imperative, necess-
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The court did not expressly establish new public use or
necessity criteria for a taking of private land.'9 However, the
Falkner decision unquestionably limits previous language0 of
the court by liberalizing the degree of uncertainty acceptable
in determining necessity or public use.2 ' In Falkner, the completion date for the second unit of the plant was indefinite, and
a number of the required tests, reports and permits had yet to
be completed. 2 Yet, impressed with the fact that twelve million dollars had been expended to date on the project, the court
stated:
There will always be some possibility that a planned improvement will not be completed and put to the use intended.
The test cannot be whether it is possible, whether it is conceivable that the project would fail. The test must be whether
there is a reasonable
assurance that the intended use will
23
come to pass.

Twelve million dollars, coupled with the time lag between completion and planning a project of this magnitude, indicated to
the court Northern States' commitment to the project and constituted reasonable assurance of the project's completion.
With the Falkner decision, the court this term has effectively closed the door to a landowner challenging the necessity
and public use of an eminent domain taking-at least where
the condemnor is a corporation with the resources necessary to
ity is required. Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957).
19. 75 Wis. 2d at 129, 248 N.W.2d at 893.
20. See, e.g., Swenson v. Milwaukee County, 266 Wis. 129, 63 N.W.2d 103 (1954);
Klump v. Cybulski, 274 Wis. 604, 81 N.W.2d 42 (1957).
21. Wisconsin Water Co. v. Winans, 85 Wis. 26, 54 N.W. 1003 (1893), involved a
water company's attempt to condemn land for a pipeline in which the taking was
prohibited, since the company had not established its legal right to conduct and
distribute the water. In New Lisbon v. Harebo, 224 Wis. 66, 271 N.W. 659 (1937), the
municipal corporation failed to obtain a permit to construct a dam. The permit was
found to be a condition precedent to a taking for public use. In Schumm v. Milwaukee
County, 258 Wis. 256, 45 N.W.2d 673 (1951), a case involving condemnation of lake
front property for a war memorial center, the court held that a contract escape clause
left open the possibility of disagreement that the contract was less a clause than a
prospectus.
It is important to note the date of these cases, decided at a time when extensive
environmental reports were not required. Today, a project of any size simply is not
considered without the "homework" being done.
22. Appellants contended that a public use can only exist when there are no contingencies that would prevent some or all of the land sought from being put to public use
and cited various contingencies respecting the Tyrone project. See note 7, supra.
23. 75 Wis. 2d at 129, 248 N.W.2d at 893.
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meet environmental impact requirements. 4 Falkneris implicit
recognition by the court of the tremendous financial outlay
required to obtain the necessary permits and reports at the
earliest planning stage. 5 It is difficult to imagine how the individual landowner will be able to discover and develop evidence
sufficient to weigh against a twelve million dollar expenditure
in that it appears that the expenditure in itself is "reasonable
assurance" that the project will be completed.2"
II. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
In DeSimone v. Kramer,7 the court distinguished between
slow and imperceptible accretions to land and accretions resulting from artificial conditions. In Wisconsin, a riparian
owner is entitled to accretions due to either natural conditions
or artificial conditions created by a third party.2 8 The accretion
is apportioned by drawing right angles to the present shore lot
lines. Prior to purchase by the plaintiff, dredging by the Army
Corps of Engineers had resulted in altering the shoreline of a
lot. The sales contract for that lot referred to 133 feet of shoreline, but as a result of the dredging only 115 feet were actually
2
conveyed.1
In DeSimone, the court departed from the traditional geom24. In Falkner, appellants also challenged the necessity of the taking in fee of their
land, asserting that an easement would have met project needs. The quantum of an
estate taken must be necessary and is not dependent upon what the owner is willing
to give up. The analysis as to what estate is reasonably necessary follows the question
of the necessity of the project as a whole. Czarnick v. Sampson Enterprises, Inc., 46
Wis. 2d 541, 175 N.W.2d 487 (1970). In Falkner, the court found the nature of the
nuclear plant and the severity of a possible nuclear accident to require exclusive
control, only available with a taking in fee. 75 Wis. 2d at 141, 248 N.W.2d at 899.
25. See KALTENBACH, GUIDE TO
VALUATION (1972).

THE SUCCESSFUL HANDLING

OF CONDEMNATION

26. As of this writing, the Wisconsin State Bar Association has begun study on the
adoption of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code. While the Code would not alleviate
the inherent proof problems of the individual landowner pitted against the multimillion dollar public utility company, the Code does provide procedural protections
with respect to condemnation proceedings and compensation standards. These protections would correct the problem of judicial review enumerated in note 13, supra,which
is inherent in Wis. STAT. ch. 32 (1975).
27. 77 Wis. 2d 188, 252 N.W.2d 653 (1977).
28. Rondesvedt v. Running, 19 Wis. 2d 614, 121 N.W.2d 1 (1963); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896). See also Note,
Artificial Addition to RiparianLand: Extending the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 AREZ.
L. RPv. 315 (1972).
29. 77 Wis. 2d at 194, 252 N.W.2d at 655.
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etry and awarded damages rather than land." To award an
additional eighteen feet of land would have resulted in interference with future property lines31 and with the recreational use
of the lots. 2 Although not without precedent,3 3 the award of
damages to the plaintiff in this decision demonstrates the value
of presenting evidence as to the type of property, current land
values and potential markets for the court's consideration of
possible remedies.
NATALIE

B.

KOEHN

TAXATION*
I.

AD VALOREM TAX

In Wisconsin, interstate air carriers who conduct part of
their operations within the state are subject to an ad valorem
tax exacted under Chapter 76 of the Wisconsin Statutes.) The
ad valorem tax is assessed in lieu of all other property taxes on
an air carrier's property within this state used in the operation
of its business. 2 The tax liability of an air carrier subject to the
ad valorem assessment in any year is the product of its Wisconsin assessed value multiplied by the average state property tax
rate.3 Included in this assessed value are both the real and
personal property of a carrier, and all rights, franchises and
30. Id. at 203, 252 N.W.2d at 659.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 196, 252 N.W.2d at 656.
33. Rondesvedt v. Running, 19 Wis. 2d 614, 121 N.W.2d 1 (1963); Jansky v. Two
Rivers, 227 Wis. 228, 278 N.W.527 (1938).
* An important tax case finding the negative-aid school financing plan unconstitutional will be the subject of a student comment in a later issue of volume 61. Buse v.
Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
1. Wis. STAT. § 76.01 (1975) provides in part: "The department of revenue shall
make an annual assessment of the property . . . of all air carriers . . .within this
state, for the purpose of levying and collecting taxes thereon, as provided in this
chapter."
2. Wis.STAT. § 76.23 (1975). Excepted from this exemption are special assessments
for local improvements.
3. Wis. STAT. § 76.12 (1975). The rate is equal to the sum of all general property
taxes levied in the prior year divided by the state assessment of all general property
within the state for the corresponding year.

